People should reach AWS accounts through central identity federation instead of local IAM users
This check looks at whether human access to your AWS accounts comes from a central identity provider or from IAM users created separately in each account. The safe setting is to manage people in one place and give them temporary access, so that joiners and leavers are handled once.
Why it matters
When people have their own IAM users in each AWS account, every account becomes a separate place to create, review and remove access. In a company with more than one account, that is where forgotten users appear: a person leaves, is disabled in the directory, and still has a working IAM user and access keys in an account nobody looked at.
AWS advises requiring human users to use federation with an identity provider and temporary credentials instead of long-term ones (Security best practices in IAM). AWS IAM Identity Center is the service built for this across an organisation, with one place to define who gets which permissions in which account (What is IAM Identity Center). Central control also makes it easier to enforce multifactor authentication consistently.
How to check it yourself
In the AWS console, open IAM > Users in each account and note who has a console password or access keys. Then open IAM Identity Center in the management account and see whether an instance is set up and whether people are assigned to accounts there.
These AWS CLI commands only read information:
aws organizations list-accounts --query "Accounts[].{id:Id,name:Name,status:Status}" --output table
aws sso-admin list-instances
aws iam list-users --query "Users[].{name:UserName,created:CreateDate,lastUsed:PasswordLastUsed}" --output tableRun the last command in every account. A long list of human-named IAM users, especially next to an empty Identity Center, shows the setup this check is looking for.
How to fix it
In the management account, enable IAM Identity Center and connect it to your existing identity provider, or use its built-in directory if you have none. Create groups that match job roles, define permission sets that grant only what each role needs, and assign the groups to the accounts they should reach.
Once people can sign in that way, retire their IAM users account by account. Review what each user did recently, then disable it before deleting it. For example, an administrator can inspect and then remove console access with:
aws iam get-user --user-name <USER>
aws iam list-access-keys --user-name <USER>
aws iam delete-login-profile --user-name <USER>These commands change your account. ConfigCobra only reads your AWS environment through a read-only role and never changes it.
What changes when you fix it
People change how they sign in: they use a single access portal address and their normal company login, then choose an account and role. Command-line users start a session with aws sso login and receive temporary credentials rather than keeping access keys on their laptops.
Anything that depends on a person's IAM user keeps working until that user is removed, so find scripts, scheduled jobs and tools that still use someone's access keys before you delete the user, and move them to IAM roles. The permission sets also need a careful design, because people may lose access they had by accident through broad policies. Roll the change out one account or team at a time and keep a break-glass path for emergencies, so that an outage at the identity provider does not leave you locked out.
Included in
| Benchmark | CIS ID | Profile |
|---|---|---|
| CIS Amazon Web Services Foundations v7.0.0 | 2.19 | Level 2 |
Check this on your AWS
ConfigCobra runs this check with every other control of the CIS Amazon Web Services Benchmarks, read-only.