Azure admin accounts should not be used for daily work
This check looks at accounts that hold privileged Azure roles and whether the same people also use them for everyday email, browsing and meetings. The safe setting is a separate, dedicated administrative account for privileged tasks, with ordinary work done from a normal account.
Why it matters
An account that reads email and browses the web is exposed to phishing and malicious downloads. If that same account also holds a powerful role, one successful attack gives the intruder administrative control. Microsoft's guidance on privileged access says to keep admin accounts separate from the accounts used for productivity and to give them only the roles they need.
Source: Microsoft Learn, Securing privileged access: accounts and Best practices for Microsoft Entra roles.
How to check it yourself
In the Azure portal open a subscription and go to Access control (IAM) > Role assignments. Look at who holds Owner, Contributor or User Access Administrator. In the Microsoft Entra admin center, open Roles & admins for directory roles. Then ask whether each person has a separate admin identity, and whether the privileged account has a mailbox or licence for productivity apps.
A read-only listing with Azure CLI:
az role assignment list --all --include-inherited \
--query "[?roleDefinitionName=='Owner' || roleDefinitionName=='Contributor'].{who:principalName,role:roleDefinitionName,scope:scope}" -o tableAccounts that look like personal day-to-day identities in this list are the ones to review.
How to fix it
Create dedicated admin accounts and move the roles over:
- In the Microsoft Entra admin center create a cloud-only account for each administrator with a clearly different name, and do not give it a mailbox or productivity licence.
- Assign the privileged roles to that account, using the narrowest role that does the job.
- Remove the same roles from the person's everyday account.
- Require strong sign-in methods on the admin accounts and ask administrators to use them only for administrative tasks.
Role removal with the CLI (placeholder values):
az role assignment delete --assignee user@contoso.example --role Contributor --scope /subscriptions/00000000-0000-0000-0000-000000000000ConfigCobra never makes these changes for you: it reports the finding and suggests the steps.
What changes when you fix it
Administrators now sign in with a second identity for privileged work, which adds a step to their day. Scripts, saved sessions and pipelines that ran under the personal account lose their permissions once the role is removed, so list them before you remove anything.
The people affected are the administrators and the owners of anything that depended on their personal account. Add the new assignments first and remove the old ones afterwards to avoid a gap in access.
Included in
| Benchmark | CIS ID | Profile |
|---|---|---|
| CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations v6.0.0 | 5.3.1 | Level 1 |
More checks in Identity Services
- Ensure that Guest Users are Reviewed on a Regular BasisCIS 5.3.2
- Ensure That Use of the 'User Access Administrator' Role is RestrictedCIS 5.3.3
- Ensure that All 'Privileged' Role Assignments are Periodically ReviewedCIS 5.3.4
- Ensure Disabled User Accounts do not Have Read, Write, or Owner PermissionsCIS 5.3.5
Check this on your Microsoft Azure
ConfigCobra runs this check with every other control of the CIS Microsoft Azure Benchmarks, read-only.