The User Access Administrator role should be assigned only where it is needed
This check looks at who holds the User Access Administrator role across your Azure subscriptions and management groups. The safe setting is to keep that role off day-to-day accounts and grant it only to the few people or break-glass accounts that truly need it.
Why it matters
User Access Administrator can grant any Azure role, including Owner, to anyone at the scope where it is held. Whoever has it can therefore give themselves or another account full control of the resources below that scope. Keeping the number of holders small, and using time-limited elevation where you can, limits how far a single compromised account can reach.
The risk grows when the role is assigned at a high scope such as a management group or a whole subscription, because it is then inherited by every resource group and resource underneath. Regular reviews of who holds it are a simple habit that catches forgotten assignments from past projects, former staff or one-off migrations.
Microsoft documents the role in Azure built-in roles and the related tenant-wide elevation in Elevate access to manage all Azure subscriptions and management groups.
How to check it yourself
Portal path: Azure portal, Subscriptions, pick a subscription, Access control (IAM), Role assignments tab, filter the Role column for User Access Administrator. Repeat for management groups.
Read-only Azure CLI command that lists every holder in the current subscription, including inherited assignments:
az role assignment list --role "User Access Administrator" --all --include-inherited --query "[].{who:principalName, type:principalType, scope:scope}" -o tableSwitch subscription with az account set --subscription <id> and run it again for each one you own. The command only lists assignments.
How to fix it
Portal steps: in Access control (IAM) for the scope, open Role assignments, tick the assignment you want to remove and select Remove. For people who occasionally need the role, make them eligible through Microsoft Entra Privileged Identity Management where your licensing includes it, so they activate it for a limited time.
Script to remove one assignment after you have confirmed it is not needed (replace the placeholders):
az role assignment delete --assignee "<user-or-object-id>" --role "User Access Administrator" --scope "/subscriptions/<subscription-id>"ConfigCobra only reads your Azure environment and shows the steps or script; it never removes the assignment itself.
What changes when you fix it
The people or service principals you remove can no longer grant or revoke access at that scope. Requests such as adding a colleague to a resource group will go to whoever still holds Owner or User Access Administrator, so name those owners first and tell teams where to ask. Automation that creates role assignments, for example an infrastructure pipeline identity, will fail on its next run if it relied on this role; check pipelines before removing it and give them a narrower role assignment with conditions where possible. Existing access that was already granted stays in place; only the ability to change it goes away.
ConfigCobra's remediation impact analysis shows the affected identities and resources before you apply the fix.
Included in
| Benchmark | CIS ID | Profile |
|---|---|---|
| CIS Microsoft Azure Foundations v6.0.0 | 5.3.3 | Level 1 |
More checks in Identity Services
- Ensure that Azure Admin Accounts Are Not Used for Daily OperationsCIS 5.3.1
- Ensure that Guest Users are Reviewed on a Regular BasisCIS 5.3.2
- Ensure that All 'Privileged' Role Assignments are Periodically ReviewedCIS 5.3.4
- Ensure Disabled User Accounts do not Have Read, Write, or Owner PermissionsCIS 5.3.5
Check this on your Microsoft Azure
ConfigCobra runs this check with every other control of the CIS Microsoft Azure Benchmarks, read-only.